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I. INTRODUCTION
The representative designated by a majority of the employees in an ap-
propriate bargaining unit has a duty to bargain fairly in behalf of all em-
*Office of the Judge Advocate General, United States Navy, Washington,
D.C. B.A., 1974, Rutgers College; J.D., 1977, University of Arkansas.
tThe author thanks his wife, Julie, for her invaluable assistance and sugges-
tions for improvement in the preparation of this Article.
1
Martucci: Martucci: Employer Liability for Union Unfair Representation:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
EMPLOYERS: UNION REPRESENTATION
ployees, union members and nonmembers alike. When an employer and a
union agree to a collective bargaining agreement the interests of the indi-
vidual employee are affected significantly. The employee's right to fair
representation is a judicially created safeguard which the law affords indi-
vidual workers against a union's abuse of power.
This Article discusses the origins of the duty of fair representation and
the judicial efforts to effectuate appropriate remedies to fully compensate
the individual worker when the employer has breached the collective bar-
gaining agreement by wrongful discharge of the worker and the union has
failed in its duty of fair representation. Particular consideration is ex-
tended to the competing interests which adhere in this context and how the
courts apportion liability between the employer and the union to accom-
modate these interests in fashioning an appropriate remedy. Only when
the competing interests are identified and evaluated can the law be fairly
judged as socially desirable. The aim of this Article is to assist in that
evaluation.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE GENESIS, EVOLUTION, AND
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
Prior to the congressional enactments of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in
19321 and the National Labor Relations Act in 1935,2 concerted employee
1. Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (current version at 29
U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976)). In 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1976), entitled "Public policy in
labor matters declared," it is stated:
In the interpretation of this chapter and in determining the jurisdic-
tion and authority of the courts of the United States, as such jurisdiction
and authority are herein defined and limited in this chapter, the public
policy of the United States is declared as follows:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the
aid of governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the
corporate and other forms of ownership association, the individual un-
organized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of con-
tract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain accept-
able terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should
be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of repre-
sentatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of
his employment, and that he shall be free from the interference, re-
straint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designa-
tion of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection; therefore, the following definitions of and limitations upon
the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the United States are
enacted.
2. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current ver-
1981]
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activities in support of demands for higher wages or better working condi-
tions were met with criminal prosecution. In the early nineteenth century,
such activities were characterized and treated as common law conspira-
cies. Later, the civil injunction was utilized as a far more effective weapon
against labor activities.3
The Norris-LaGuardia Act marked a new direction with its declara-
tion that the public policy of the United States was to ensure employees full
freedom to organize and to bargain collectively without employer inter-
ference. In order to effectuate that goal, the Act severely limited the issu-
ance of injunctions in labor disputes. 4 Even today, the Act's restriction of
injunctions remains viable. 5
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA) expressly estab-
lished one of the cardinal principles of American labor law: exclusive
representation by the majority. Section 9(a) of the Act provides in perti-
nent part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit ap-
propriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives
of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
or other conditions of employment .... 6
sion at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. II 1978)) [hereinafter referred to as
NLRA].
3. See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZA-
TION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 1-6 (1976); H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND
THE LEGAL PROCESS 38-46 (1968).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) provides:
No court of the United States, as defined in this chapter, shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent in-
junction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in
strict conformity with the provisions of this chapter; nor shall any such
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction be issued con-
trary to the public policy declared in this chapter.
5. See, e.g., Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397
(1976). The Supreme Court ruled that the Boys Markets exception to the Norris-'
LaGuardia Act was limited to arbitrable disputes concerning the meaning of the
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, the Norris-
LaGua rdia Act does not permit the enjoining of disputes other than those nar-
rowly excepted from its prohibition in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local
770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). For a discussion of how a Boys Markets injunction may
be utilized against an employer, see Note, Boys Markets Injunctions Against
Employers, 91 HARV. L. REV. 715 (1978). See generally Relias, The Developing
Law Under Boys Markets, 23 LAB. L.J. 758 (1972); Project, The Supreme Court,
1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 192-211 (1970); Comment, Labor Law-Avail-
ability of Injunctive Relief to Restrain Sympathy Strikes, 43 MO. L. REV. 503
(1978).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 46
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Thus, the NLRA adopts the principle of majority rule which has been a
fundamental component of America's political decision-making process
and tradition.
In addition to exclusivity and majority rule, the NLRA premises na-
tional labor policy upon an acceptance of the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining.7 Collective bargaining becomes the means by which
industrial strife is to be resolved. Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA makes it an
unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively
with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of sec-
tion 9(a)."1
The growth of labor unions in modem industrial society is in large part
attributable to the national labor policy of encouraging collective bargain-
ing.9 This policy is predicated on the belief that majority representation is
the most efficient and effective means by which employees' benefits are
enhanced and industrial stability achieved. 10 Underlying this policy is the
7. Id. § 151, which states in relevant part:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce
and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have oc-
curred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargain-
ing and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of associa-
tion, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
8. Id: "§ 158(a)(5).
9. It should be noted that in recent years the percentage of union members
in the total work force has declined. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. NO. 2044, DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL UNIONS AND
EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATIONS (1980).
10. See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975). In Emporium, the NLRB dismissed a com-
plaint alleging the employer violated § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by discharging two
black employees who picketed, handbilled, and attempted to bargain with their
employer over allegedly racially discriminatory employment practices. The
Board concluded the employees' conduct undermined the ongoing collective
bargaining agreement and the principle of exclusivity by attempting to circum-
vent their elected representative to engage in such bargaining. Emporium and
Western Addition Community Organization, 192 N.L.R.B. 173 (1971), rev'd,
485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western
Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reversed the Board's finding of a violation of the union's exclusivity. The court
found protected concerted activity due to the involvement of racial discrimina-
tion and the statutory prohibition of such discrimination in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Western Addition Community Organization v. NLRB, 485
F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western
Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
1981]
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subjugation of the individual employee's pursuit and advocacy of his inter-
est to the expression of that interest collectively through a majority repre-
sentative.
It was early held that an employer could not lawfully insist that the
union bargain only for its members. Employers argued that to grant the
union exclusive representation status on behalf of all employees would un-
duly hamper those employees who had voted against union representation.
That argument was rejected. The courts reasoned that the NLRA over-
rode the preference of the minority within the unit and that the employer
had to recognize the majority union as the sole spokesman for all em-
ployees within the bargaining unit. 1 Simply put, the rule now is that when
the preference of the individual conflicts with the majority, it is the indi-
vidual who must yield to the group's collective interest.
When an individual union member's actions endanger the interests of
the group as expressed through its union representatives, the union has the
authority to discipline the recalcitrant individual. This authority was
recognized by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufac-
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and found that attempts to
engage in separate bargaining were proscribed by § 9(a) of the NLRA and not
protected under § 7 of the NLRA. The Court recognized the role of Title VII by
noting that a suit could be brought under that statute. Nonetheless, the discrimi-
nation suit was found to be a matter separate and apart from the employees'
violation of the exclusivity principle. Thus, the Court favored the orderly collec-
tive-bargaining process contemplated by the NLRA. See generally Cassel, The
Emporium Case, Title VII Rights and The Collective Bargaining Process, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 1347 (1975).
11. See, e.g., NLRB v. Boss Mfg. Co., 107 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1939). This is
not to imply that a minority employee (one who has voted against the majority
union) relinquishes all rights. The proviso to § 9(a) of the NLRA states:
[A]ny individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at
any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such griev-
ances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representa-
tive, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a col-
lective-bargaining agreement contract or agreement then in effect ....
Moreover, § 14(b) embodies the so-called "right to work." It provides:
"Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or applica-
tion of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is
prohibited by State or Territorial law." Thus, the NLRA reserves to the states the
prerogative to define their own law respecting union membership. See generally
Youngdahl, Thirteen Years of the 'Right to Work' in Arkansas, 14 ARK. L. REV.
289 (1960). See also Hopson, Whither Hurried Hence- The New Right to Work
Amendment, 8 KAN. L. REV. 18 (1959); Kovack, National Right to Work Law:
An Affirmative Position, 28 LAB. L.J. 305 (1977); Comment, Applicability of
State Right-to- Work Laws: Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 1078 (1977).
[Vol. 46
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turing Co.1 2 A statutory basis for union discipline is found in section
8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA, wherein it is stated:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents-
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, that this paragraph shall
not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own
rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership
therein .... 1s
Moreover, the union's power to discipline is inferred from and vital to its
role as exclusive representative under the federal labor statutes.1 4
The principles of majoritarianism and exclusivity are subject to the
competing interests of the minority within the unit. Accommodation of
the competing interests is found in several limitations imposed upon the
union.'a The most significant limitation is the duty of fair representation.
12. 388 U.S. 175 (1967). In Allis-Chalmers, the Court upheld the union's
authority to fine union members who crossed a picket line set up by the union's
striking members. The case raises the issue of priorities of union security and
employee freedom. See generally Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What
the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175 (1960).
Whether a union should be given such broad discretion in the imposition of
rules upon its members has been questioned. See Browne, The Labor Board
Unsettles the Scales, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 133, 148-49 (1966). Mr. Browne has
elsewhere observed:
Board decisions involve more than the relationship between manage-
ment and unions. They also involve decisions relating to union control
over its members. In 1959 Congress gave abundant recognition to the
fact that the rights of unions carried commensurate responsibilities and
obligations to act in the interest of their members and the public. The
Board, however, when confronted with a choice between union power
vis-a-vis individual rights, appears to side with the former.
Browne, A Management View of NLRA Reform, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 32, 57-58
(1976). See also Comment, Fair Representation and Union Discipline, 79 YALE
L.J. 730 (1970).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976).
14. This exclusivity is established in both the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 151, 152 (1976), and the Taft-Hartley Act of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151,
159(a) (1976).
15. Examples of the limitations imposed upon unions in an effort to accom-
modate these competing interests have been outlined in R. GORMAN, supra note
3, at 279-80. First, the majority union is exclusive representative, in the words of§
9(a), only for "the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes." Second,
the duty not to deal with individuals and minority unions applies only to "rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment" as stated
in § 9(a). Third, § 9(a) provides that the duty not to deal with individuals applies
only "for the purposes of collective bargaining." Fourth, the duty to bargain with
a certified or recognized union is limited by specific rules promulgated by the
6
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The authority of a union to act as the exclusive representative is subject to
a correlative obligation to fairly represent all within the unit. The union's
obligation to represent all employees fairly is a judicially fashioned duty
implied in section 9(a) of the NLRA.1s
The doctrine was first discussed in Steele v. Louisille & Nashville Rail-
road,I7 a case arising under the Railway Labor Act.18 In Steele, the rail-
road company and the union representing its firemen negotiated several
collective bargaining provisions which set a ceiling upon the number of
black employees to be assigned certain work. The agreement also severely
restricted access by black employees to certain jobs. A number of black
employees initiated a suit against both the employer and the union on the
basis of the racially discriminatory agreement which had resulted in their
loss of employment. The Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the com-
plaint, finding that it failed to state a cause of action because the authority
of the statutory bargaining agent to negotiate and modify the rights of
employees within the unit was absolute.
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Alabama court
by holding that the Railway Labor Act implicitly "expresses the aim of
Congress to ipose on the bargaining representative of a craft or class of
employees the duty to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf
of all those for whom it acts, without hostile discrimination against
them." 9 The Court recognized that the statutory representative (the
union) was vested with discretion in making employment contracts, even if
those contracts resulted in "unfavorable effects on some of the members of
the craft represented. " 20 The Court held, however, that discriminatory
contracts based on irrelevant factors such as race are an impermissible ex-
ercise of union discretion and violative of the duty of fair representation.
When such a violation occurs, an injured employee may "resort to the
usual judicial remedies of injunction and award of damages when appro-
priate.'
Board. Finally, the Landrum-Griffin Amendments of 1959 incorporate a "Bill of
Rights" intended to serve as safeguards for individual rights in intra-union af-
fairs. 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415 (1976).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). See generally Cox, The Duty of Fair Repre-
sentation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151 (1957); Comment, The Duty of Fair Representa-
tion, 20 CATH. L. REV. 271 (1970). See also Clark, The Duty of Fair Representa-
tion: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1119 (1973); Murphy, The Duty
of Fair Representation Under Taft-Hartley, 30 Mo. L. REV. 373 (1965).
For a discussion of how the NLRB handles the duty of fair representation, see
Fanning, The Duty of Fair Representation, 19 B.C.L. REV. 813 (1978); Com-
ment, Unfair Representation and the National Labor Relations Board: A Func-
tional Analysis, 37J. AIR L. & COM. 89 (1971).
17. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
18. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976).
19. 323 U.S. at 202-03.
20. Id. at 203.
21. Id. at 207.
[Vol. 46
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In Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 22 a case decided on the same day as Steele,
the Court indicated in dicta that bargaining agents under the NLRA are
"charged with the responsibility of representing ... [employees'] interests
fairly and impartially. ' 2 Nine years later, the contours of the discretion
vested in the union to create reasonable distinctions among groups of
employees were explored in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman.24 In Huffman,
the Court upheld the validity of an agreement between Ford Motor Com-
pany and the UAW which afforded seniority credit for military service to
veterans who had not worked for the company prior to their military ser-
vice in World War II. Balancing the competing interests of veteran and
nonveteran employees, the Court explained:
Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the
terms of any negotiated agreement affect individual employees
and classes of employees. The mere existence of such differences
does not make them invalid. The complete satisfaction of all who
are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of reason-
ableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in
serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith
and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion. 25
Although Huffman was im _plicitly based on an extension of the duty of
fair representation to cases arising under the NLRA, the Supreme Court
first declared the extension in Syres v. Oil Workers International Union.2
6
Subsequent cases have extended the duty of the union beyond the negotia-
tion stage to encompass the administration of the agreement as well.
27
In Smith v. Evening News Association,28 the Supreme Court provided
the procedural vehicle by which an individual aggrieved employee could
sue his employer for a breach of the collective bargaining agreement.
Evening News held that a suit by an individual employee against his
employer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement was a suit for the
violation of a contract between an employer and a labor organization
within the meaning of section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act.2 9 Mr. Justice White, speaking for the Court, explained:
22. 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
23. Id. at 255. The Court explained that "[t]he duties of a bargaining agent
... extend beyond the mere representation of the interests of its own group mem-
bers. By its selection as bargaining representative, it has become the agent of all
the employees. . . ." Id.
24. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
25. Id. at 338.
26. 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (per curiam).
27. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 564-67
(1976) (discussed in text accompanying notes 76-91 infra); Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171, 177 (1967) (discussed in text accompanying notes 34-63 infra).
28. 371 U.S. 195 (1962). See generally Labor Law-The Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement and NLRB Pre-emption, 29 MO. L. REV. 107 (1964).
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The rights of individual employees concerning rates of pay and
conditions of employment are a major focus of the negotiation and
administration of collective bargaining contracts. Individual
claims lie at the heart of the grievance and arbitration machinery,
are to a large degree inevitably intertwined with union interests
and many times precipitate grave questions concerning the inter-
pretation and enforceability of the collective bargaining contract
on which they are based. To exclude these claims from the ambit
of § 301 would stultify the congressional policy of having the ad-
ministration of collective bargaining contracts accomplished
under a uniform body of federal substantive law.8 0
In Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,"1 an employee brought a section
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce
as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be
brought in any district court of the United Stites having jurisdiction of
the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties.
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an indus-
try affecting commerce as defined in this Act and any employer whose
activities affect commerce as defined in this Act shall be bound by the
acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an
entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of
the United States. Any money judgment against a labor organization in a
district court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the
organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforce-
able against any individual member or his assets.
(c) For the purposes of actions and proceedings by or against labor
organizations in the district courts of the United States, district courts
shall be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor organization (1) in the
district in which such organization maintains its principal office, or (2)
in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents are engaged
in representing or acting for employee members.
(d) The service of summons, subpoena, or other legal process of any
court of the United States upon an officer or agent of a labor organiza-
tion, in his capacity as such, shall constitute service upon the labor
organization.
(e) For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any
person is acting as an "agent" of another person so as to make such other
person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts
performed were actually authorized or mubsequently ratified shall not be
controlling.
See generally Comment, Aspects of Suits to Enforce Collective Bargaining
Agreements Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 13 ARK. L. REV. 58 (1959).
30. 371 U.S. at 200.
31. 379 U.S. 650 (1965). For a discussion of the Maddox case, see Labor
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301 suit in a state court against his employer for severance pay allegedly
due him under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between
his employer and his union. The collective bargaining agreement con-
tained a three-step grievance procedure, but the employee made no effort
to secure a remedy through these procedures. It was held that the em-
ployee must at least attempt to exhaust contract grievance procedures
through his union before suing the employer. As Mr. Justice Harlan ob-
served for the Court: "[I]t cannot be said, in the normal situation, that
contract grievance procedures are inadequate to protect the interests of an
aggrieved employee until the employee has attempted to implement the
procedures and found them so." 32 The Court did not address the issue of
whether the employee would have any remedy against his employer, or the
form that remedy might take, in the event that the union refused to pre-
sent his claim or presented it in a perfunctory manner. The Supreme
Court's decision in Vaca v. Sipes, s which addressed these issues, consti-
tutes the primary focus of this Article.
III. VACA V. SIPES: THE APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY PRINCIPLE
IN ASSESSING DAMAGES BETWEEN EMPLOYER AND UNION
In 1967 the Supreme Court in Vaca v. Sipes 4 addressed a largely un-
settled and controversial area of labor law concerning the rights and
remedies of individual employees vis-a-vis the union and the employer
under a collective bargaining agreement. A detailed explanation of the
Vaca facts is necessary for a thorough understanding of the Court's legal
analysis. Even today, Vaca v. Sipes remains the most helpful source of
guidance in this sometimes abstruse area of labor law.
In mid-1959 Benjamin Owens, an employee of Swift & Company's
(Swift) Kansas City Meat Packing Plant, became ill and entered a hospital
on sick leave. Owens, who had a history of high blood pressure, recovered
after a long period of convalescence. His family doctor certified him as fit
to resume his work in the packing plant.85 Upon his return to work, Owens
was examined by Swift's company doctor who concluded that his blood
pressure was too high to permit reinstatement. Owens then secured a sec-
ond authorization from another doctor not affiliated with Swift and re-
turned to work based on the permission of a company nurse. When
Swift's doctor discovered two days later that Owens had returned to work,
Owens was permanently discharged because of poor health.
32. 379 U.S. at 653. The Court noted, "Employer interests, for their part,
are served by limiting the choice of remedies available to aggrieved employees."
Id.
33. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
34. Id.
35. Owens' employment was characterized as "heavy work." Id. at 174.
1981]
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Owens sought the union's assistance in securing reinstatement, and a
grievance on his behalf was filed by the union with Swift. The collective
bargaining agreement between Swift and the union created a five-step
grievance procedure. Steps one and two provided for either the employee
or the union's representative to present the grievance to Swift's department
foreman, and then to present it in writing to the division superintendent.
Step three required a meeting of the grievance committees of the union
and management. The result of that meeting necessitated that the com-
pany articulate its position in writing and present it to the union. In the
fourth step, a meeting between representatives of the national union and
Swift's general superintendent was provided. The fifth and final step em-
powered the national union to refer the grievance to a specified arbi-
trator.
36
By late 1960 the grievance had been processed through the fourth step
of the grievance procedure without success. Swift rejected Owens' presen-
tation of his certified bill of health by two noncompany doctors. Numerous
medical reports of reduced blood pressure were rejected by Swift because
of its belief that they were not based on sufficiently thorough medical tests.
Thus, through the fourth step of the grievance process, Swift asserted its
original finding that Owens' poor health justified his discharge.
On completion of step four, the union sent Owens to a new doctor in
an attempt to secure more thorough evidence for arbitration. The exami-
nation did not support Owens' retention. Accordingly, the union's execu-
tive board decided not to pursue the final step of the grievance procedure
(arbitration) because of insufficient medical evidence. Owens rejected the
union's recommendation that he accept Swift's offer of referral to a
rehabilitation center. The union refused Owens' demand that the griev-
ance be taken to arbitration. Owens responded by filing a suit against the
union alleging that the union had "'arbitrarily, capriciously and without
just or reasonable reason or cause' ,,37 refused to take his grievance to arbi-
tration under the grievance procedures of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.
Owens filed his suit against the union in a Missouri state court. In a
jury trial, a verdict was returned awarding Owens $7,000.00 compensatory
and $3,300.00 punitive damages. The trial judge set aside the jury verdict
and entered judgment for the union on the ground that a breach of the
duty of fair representation is arguably an unfair labor practice over which
the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction. The Kansas City Court of Appeals af-
firmed the trial judge's ruling. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed and
reinstated the verdict in finding that the Board did not possess exclusive
36. Id. at 175 n.3.
37. Id. at 173.
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jurisdiction in actions alleging a union's breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation.38
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice White,
granted certiorari "to consider whether exclusive jurisdiction lies with the
NLRB and, if not, whether the finding of Union liability and the relief
afforded Owens are consistent with governing principles of federal labor
law."3 9 In answering the first question, the Court was unequivocal in rul-
ing that the courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the NLRB to enforce
the duty of fair representation. The Court noted that "the decision to pre-
empt federal and state court jurisdiction over a given class of cases must
depend upon the nature of the particular interests being asserted and the
effect upon the administration of national labor policies of concurrent
judicial and administrative remedies., 40 Recognizing that the duty of fair
representation was a judicially fashioned doctrine developed in Steele4 1
and its progeny, the Court found that the
primary justification for the pre-emption doctrine -the need to
avoid conflicting rules of substantive law in the labor relations area
and the desirability of leaving the development of such rules to the
administrative agency created by Congress for that purpose...
[was] not applicable to cases involving alleged breaches of the
union's duty of fair representation. 42
Furthermore, the Court referred to "the unique interests served by the
duty of fair representation ' 43 and the necessity of judicial supervision to
assure that an individual employee's interests are protected. In this regard,
it was said:
This Court recognized in Steele that the congressional grant of
power to a union to act as exclusive collective bargaining represen-
tative, with its corresponding reduction in the individual rights of
the employees so represented, would raise grave constitutional
problems if unions were free to exercise this power to further racial
discrimination.... Since that landmark decision, the duty of fair
representation has stood as a bulwark to prevent arbitrary union
conduct against individuals stripped of traditional forms of redress
by the provisions of federal labor law.44
Equally vital to the Court's decision that the Board and the courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over fair representation suits was its discussion of
the scope of the union's duty of fair representation and the judicial
remedies available to the aggrieved individual employee. As to the scope of
38. 397 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. En Banc 1965), rev'd, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
39. 386 U.S. at 174.
40. Id. at 180-81.
41. See notes 17-21 and accompanying text supra.
42. 386 U.S. at 180-81.
43. Id. at 181.
44. Id. at 182 (citations omitted).
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the duty, the Court explained that "[a] breach of the statutory duty of fair
representation occurs only when a union's conduct toward a member of
the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad
faith. 14 5 Regarding judicial remedies, the Supreme Court has discussed
three alternatives available to ensure the protection of individual rights
under the collective bargaining agreement.
One alternative was expressed by Mr. Justice Black in his dissenting
opinion in Vaca, wherein he took the position that the discharged em-
ployee should have an absolute right to bring a breach of contract action
against his employer. In response to the argument that compliance with
established grievance procedures is vital to the national labor policy goal
of encouraging the peaceful resolution of labor disputes in accordance
with the method adopted by the parties, Justice Black wrote:
[T]he Court suggests that its decision "furthers the interest of the
union as statutory agent." I think this is the real reason for today's
decision which entirely overlooks the interests of the injured em-
ployee, the only one who has anything to lose. Of course, anything
which gives the union life and death power over those whom it is
supposed to represent furthers its "interest." I simply fail to see
how the union's legitimate role as statutory agent is undermined by
requiring it to prosecute all serious grievances to a conclusion or by
allowing the injured employee to sue his employer after he has
given the union a chance to act on his behalf.
... [R]equiring the individual employee to take on both the
employer and the union in every suit against the employer and to
prove not only that the employer breached its contract, but that
the union acted arbitrarily, converts what would otherwise be a
simple breach-of-contract action into a three-ring donnybrook. 4"
Thus, Justice Black viewed the union's breach of its duty of fair representa-
tion as legally irrelevant to the employee's suit against the employer. Im-
plicit in this absolute right of an employee to pursue his grievance to the
arbitration stage or to sue his employer for breach of contract is the eleva-
tion of the individual employee's interests to that of highest priority. This
follows from Mr. Justice Black's finding that the majority's decision "over-
looks the interests of the injured employee, the only one who has anything
to lose."'4?
The opposite alternative was articulated by Mr. Justice Goldberg in his
concurring opinion in Humphrey v. Moore .48 In Humphrey, the Supreme
Court rejected a challenge by an individual employee to the modification
45. Id. at 190.
46. Id. at 209-10 (Black, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 209 (Black, J., dissenting).
48. 375 U.S. 335, 351 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring). For a discussion of
Humphrey, see Labor Law-NLRA-Union's Duty to Represent Fairly, 17
VAND. L. REV. 1328 (1964).
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of his contractual seniority rights by joint employer-union action. The suit
was analyzed as both one for breach of fair representation and breach of
the employment contract.4 9 Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion took the posi-
tion that individual employees should not be permitted to sue an employer
under section 301 for violation of an employment contract because there
were "too many unforeseeable contingencies in a collective bargaining
relationship to justify making the words of the contract the exclusive
source of rights and duties." 50 Therefore, an aggrieved discharged em-
ployee would be limited to a fair representation suit against the union.
Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion in Humphrey is premised on a finding
that the interests of the employer and the union in maintaining a flexible,
workable employment contract is more highly valued than the interests of
individual employees in having the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement enforced as originally written. The approaches of Justices
Black and Goldberg find their common ground in each one's refusal to
wed the duty of fair representation to a section 301 suit against the
employer. The former finds an absolute right to sue the employer under
section 301; the latter finds no such right under any circumstances.
The majority of the Supreme Court in Vaca took an intermediate ap-
proach, thus rejecting the polar positions advanced by Justices Black and
Goldberg. Mr. Justice White, speaking for the Court, wed the employee's
section 301 suit against the employer for breach of the employment con-
tract to the union's failure to exercise its duty of fair representation. Thus,
the analysis of the majority identified the confluence of the union's failure
to exercise its duty with the employer's breach of the contract by wrong-
fully discharging the employee. In an effort to balance the competing in-
terests of the employee, the union, and the employer in formulating na-
tional labor policy, the Vaca Court reasoned:
[T]he employer... may have done nothing to prevent exhaustion
of the exclusive contractual remedies to which he agreed in the col-
lective bargaining agreement. But the employer has committed a
wrongful discharge in breach of that agreement, a breach which
could be remedied through the grievance process to the employee-
plaintiff's benefit were it not for the union's breach of its statutory
duty of fair representation to the employee. To leave the employee
remediless in such circumstances would, in our opinion, be a great
injustice. We cannot believe that Congress, in conferring upon
employers and unions the power to establish exclusive grievance
procedures, intended to confer upon unions such unlimited discre-
tion to deprive injured employees of all remedies for breach of con-
tract. Nor do we think that Congress intended to shield employers
from the natural consequences of their breaches of bargaining
49. 375 U.S. at 343-44.
50. Id. at 353-54 (Goldberg, J., concurring). See generally Cox, Rights
Under A Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1956).
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agreements by wrongful union conduct in the enforcement of such
agreements.
For these reasons, we think the wrongfully discharged em-
ployee may bring an action against his employer in the face of a
defense based upon the failure to exhaust contractual remedies,
provided the employee can prove that the union as bargaining
agent breached its duty offair representation in its handling of the
employee's grievance. 1
Thus, the Court provided the individual employee with a judicial
avenue to seek relief. The right to bring suit, however, is not absolute.
Rather, it is conditioned upon the employee's success in establishing that
the union has actually breached its statutory duty of fair representation.
The majority's reluctance to accept a rule permitting an individual em-
ployee to compel arbitration of his grievance regardless of its merit was
founded on relevant practical considerations and national labor policy.
The Court reasoned that by finding an absolute right "the settlement
machinery provided by the contract would be substantially undermined,
thus destroying the employer's confidence in the union's authority and
returning the individual grievant to the vagaries of independent and un-
systematic negotiations." 52 Moreover, the resulting greater number of
grievances and the attendant increased cost of the grievance machinery
"could so overburden the arbitration process as to prevent it from func-
tioning successfully. 5 Finally, in justification of the majority's inter-
mediate position, the Court stated: "Nor do we see substantial danger to
the interests of the individual employee if his statutory agent is given the
contractual power honestly and in good faith to settle grievances short of
arbitration. 5 4
IV. THE COMPETING INTERESTS UNDERLYING VACA V. SIPES
In the context of the national labor scheme, there are competing inter-
ests involved. Vaca v. Sipes is a landmark decision in this area of labor law
because it was the first case (and remains the most illuminating discussion)
in which the Supreme Court grappled with the competing interests which
adhere in the collective bargaining agreement and the administration of
51. 386 U.S. at 185-86 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
For an excellent discussion of the practical problems an employee encounters in
the course of his lawsuit, see Tobias, Individual Employee Suits for Breach of the
Labor Agreement and the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 5 U. TOL. L.
REV. 514 (1974).
52. 386 U.S. at 191.
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that agreement. It is the accommodation of these often conflicting inter-
ests which lies at the heart of the Supreme Court's analysis in Vaca.
Undoubtedly, such an accommodation requires a balancing of inter-
ests. The result in a given case is inexorably a reflection of how this balance
is struck. Law is not always logical. Indeed, at times, law must depart from
the utilization of the tools of pure logic-even from the analogy of logic.
This is because it is not logic alone that shapes the law, but the socio-
economic conditions which the law seeks to serve. 55 The words of Mr.
Justice'Holmes have particular significance in the analysis of judicial opin-
ions which address the remedies available to an aggrieved employee under
the collective bargaining agreement. Mr. Justice Holmes explained:
The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic.
And the logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty
and for repose which is in every human mind. Behind the logical
form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of
competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and uncon-
scious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the
whole proceeding. 5
The four interests which adhere in this context are those of union,
employer, individual employee, and society. Simply stated, the interest of
the union is in maintaining the power vital to its role as exclusive bargain-
ing agent. The employer's interest lies in the maintenance of an efficient,
responsive work force and adherence to the agreed-upon grievance pro-
cedures embodied in the collective bargaining agreement. The individual
employee's interest is in the restoration of his employment status and to be
"made whole" for the damage attributable to his loss of employment and
the union's failure to fairly represent him. Society's interest is the peaceful,
orderly, and just resolution of employment disputes between union,
employer, and individual employee. The societal interest as expressed
through legislation favors the procedures agreed upon by the parties for
resolution of disputes. 57 But the judicial function must balance that desire
55. See Leflar, Sources ofJudge-Made Law, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 319 (1971);
Leflar, The Great and Common Law, 30 ARK. L. REV. 395 (1977).
56. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465-66 (1897).
57. This policy is expressed in the Labor Management Relations Act §
203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976):
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby
declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes
arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-
bargaining agreement.
See also Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965); United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-99 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960).
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with the corollary societal interest in the protection of the individual
employee as embodied in sections 7 and 9 of the NLRA. 58
V. THE PRINCIPLE OF APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY
In its discussion of the individual employee's relief for a breach of the
union's duty of fair representation, the Court in Vaca v. Sipes stated that
the "appropriate remedy... must vary with the circumstances of the par-
ticular breach."-5 9 After finding that the courts could properly "decide the
contractual claim and award the employee appropriate damages or
equitable relief, '60 the Court announced the principle to be applied in
apportioning liability:
The governing principle, then, is to apportion liability be-
tween the employer and the union according to the damage
caused by the fault of each. Thus, damages attributable solely to
the employer's breach of contract should not be charged to the
union, but increases in any of those damages caused by the union's
refusal to process the grievance should not be charged to the
employer.61
In Vaca, the Court proceeded to find that "even if the Union had
breached its duty, all or almost all of Owens' damages would still be at-
tributable to his allegedly wrongful discharge by Swift." 62 The Court
found no liability attributable to the union's failure to process the
grievance. The Court explained:
A more difficult question is, what portion of the employee's
damages may be charged to the union: in particular, may an
award against a union include, as it did here, damages attribut-
able solely to the employer's breach of contract? We think not.
Though the union has violated a statutory duty in failing to press
the grievance, it is the employer's unrelated breach of contract
which triggered the controversy and which caused this portion of
the employee's damages. The employee should have no difficulty
recovering these damages from the employer, who cannot, as we
have explained, hide behind the union's wrongful failure to act; in
fact, the employer may be (and probably should be) joined as a
58. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 159 (1976). See generally Blumrosen, Group Interests
in Labor Law, 13 RUTGERs L. REV. 432 (1958); Cox, Rights Under a Labor
Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1956); Comment, Individual Control Over
Personal Grievances Under Vaca v. Sipes, 77 YALE L.J. 559 (1968).
59. 386 U.S. at 195.
60. Id. at 196.
61. Id. at 197-98. See also Linsey, The Apportionment of Liability for
Damages Between Employer and Union in § 301 Actions Involing a Union's
Breach of Its Duty of Fair Representation, 30 MERCER L. REV. 661 (1979).
62. 386 U.S. at 198.
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defendant in the fair representation suit, as in Humphrey v.
Moore .... It could be a real hardship on the union to pay these
damages, even if the union were given a right of indemnification
against the employer. With the employee assured of direct re-
covery from the employer, we see no merit in requiring the union
to pay the employer's share of the damages. 63
Thus, the Court in Vaca found that all liability should fall upon the
employer (assuming the plaintiff could establish the union's failure to ex-
ercise its duty of fair representation) because it was the employer's initia-
tion of discharge which effectuated the employee's resulting damage.
Although the Court announced the governing principle to be one of ap-
portionment of liability according to damages attributable either to the
employer's initiation of the discharge or to the union's violation of its duty,
no attempt to distinguish the damages resulting from the action of the
employer as contrasted with the action of the union was attempted other
than to say that the damages were "solely" attributable to the employer.
The Court failed to determine what damages were attributable to the
union's violation of its duty. The Court's analytical failure is frequently
emulated in the lower court cases discussed below. Why have the courts
not taken the next step in the analysis of apportionment of liability?
VI. THE APPLICATION OF THE APPORTIONMENT PRINCIPLE
OF VACA V. SIPES
The issue of union liability in a fair representation suit was addressed
by the Supreme Court in 1970 in Czosek v. O'Mara.64 The Court held that
the complaint by former employees brought against the union established
that the union had, in fact, violated its duty of fair representation. In
addressing the union's fears that it would be held liable for all damages
resulting from the employer's discharge of the plaintiffs, the Court indi-
cated that such fears were groundless. The Court was satisfied that the
court of appeals had permitted the railroad, the defendant-employer, to
be made a party to the suit if it could properly be alleged that the discharge
was a consequence of the union's discriminatory conduct or that the em-
ployer was in any other way implicated in the union's alleged discrimina-
tory action. Mr. Justice White, speaking for the Court, explained:
If these allegations are not made and the employer is not a party
defendant, judgment against petitioners can in any event be had
only for those damages that flowed from their own conduct.
Assuming a wrongful discharge by the employer independent of
any discriminatory conduct by the union and a subsequent dis-
criminatory refusal by the union to process grievances based on the
63. Id. at 196-97 (footnote omitted).
64. 397 U.S. 25 (1970).
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discharge, damages against the union for loss of employment are
unrecoverable except to the extent that its refusal to handle the
grievances added to the difficulty and expense of collecting from
the employer. If both the union and the employer have indepen-
dently caused damage to employees, the union cannot complain if
separate actions are brought against it and the employer for the
portion of the total damages caused by each. 65
In De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse,66 the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered an action by dis-
charged employees to recover from an employer for alleged violations of a
seniority provision of the collective bargaining agreement and from the
union for its alleged breach of the duty of fair representation. The plain-
tiffs were seven telephone operators formerly employed by the defendant
Puerto Rico Telephone Company. They were discharged by the company
allegedly in contravention of the seniority provisions of the collective bar-
gaining agreement between the company and the union. The plaintiffs
had immediately communicated the fact of their discharge to the union,
but the union failed to take their claims through the grievance procedure.
Thus, the plaintiffs filed suit against both the union and the company.
At the district court level, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the dis-
charged plaintiffs, finding that the company had violated the seniority
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. A second jury found
that the union had breached its duty of fair representation with respect to
six of the seven plaintiffs. Accordingly, the jury awarded the plaintiffs the
appropriate amounts for their lost earnings, allocating the liability be-
tween the company and the union.
On appeal, the First Circuit found that the union had, in fact, failed to
exercise its duty of fair representation in handling the submitted griev-
ances. The court based its decision upon the union's arbitrary and per-
functory handling of the grievances, but noted specifically that the union
had not acted with bad faith, hostility, discrimination, or dishonesty.
Although the court found that the union had breached its duty of fair
representation, it also found that the plaintiffs' suit against the union was
barred by the one-year Puerto Rico statute of limitations for tort actions.
The court specifically rejected the characterization of the plaintiffs' suit
against the union as one sounding in contract. The court reasoned:
We are therefore satisfied that any effort to characterize plain-
tiffs' suit against the Union as a "contract" action is both unsound
and unnecessary in order to effectuate existing federal labor
policies. Moreover, the Union's duty seems more akin to, though
less rigorous than, the duty of due care normally associated with
65. Id. at 29. For an unusual case in which a court did assess all damages
against a union without addressing the Vaca principle, see Griffin v. UAW, 469
F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972).
66. 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
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tort actions. Finally, we detect ... a distinct preference for the
shorter statute of limitations where the question of characteriza-
tion is a close one and no manifest injustice results from such
choice, which preference suggests the tort limitations period in
most jurisdictions. 6 7
The court then proceeded to determine the amount of lost earnings
properly chargeable to the company. The court looked to Vaca v. Sipes for
guidance on the allocation of lost earnings where the company discharges
improperly and the union represents unfairly. The court noted that Vaca
instructed that the company is only liable for damages attributable solely
to its breach of contract. The court found that
where there had been no suggestion that the Union participated in
the Company's improper discharge and where there was no evi-
dence that but for the Union's conduct the plaintiffs would have
been reinstated or reimbursed at an earlier date, we conclude that
the Union's conduct cannot be said to have increased or con-
tributed to the damages attributable to the Company's improper
discharge. 68
Thus, the court found that the entire amount of lost earnings of each
plaintiff was properly chargeable to the company.
As compensation for the damages incurred after the date of the district
court's judgment, the plaintiffs sought either reinstatement or money
damages for future lost earnings, both of which were denied by the district
court. The court of appeals found it unrealistic to assume that the injury to
an improperly discharged employee continues only until the date of a trial
court's judgment. The court noted that in the normal case reinstatement
67. 425 F.2d at 287. The applicable statute of limitations is a question
which has been handled in a variety of ways. In Wallace v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 460 F. Supp. 755 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), the court applied the same statute of
limitations to both the employer for wrongful discharge and the union for breach
of the duty of fair representation. The Wallace court held that where there had
been a previous arbitration award sustaining the employee's discharge, the em-
ployee's action against his former employer for wrongful discharge had to be
characterized as an action to vacate the previous arbitration award, and thus was
subject to a New York statute providing for a 90-day limitations period for actions
of that nature.
See generally Note, Statute of Limitations Governing Fair Representation
Against Union Action When Brought With Section 301 Action Against Em-
ployer, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 418 (1976), which contains an excellent discus-
sion regarding the issue of which statute of limitations applies. The Note con-
siders the consequences of applying different statutes of limitations depending on
whether the suit includes an action against the employer. A cogent argument is
advanced for the uniform application of the contract statute of limitations when
an employee brings an action-for breach of the duty of fair representation in con-
junction with an action for breach of the employment contract under § 301.
68. 425 F.2d at 289-90.
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constitutes one form of prospective relief which has some assurance of
making employees whole while avoiding the difficult problem of quantify-
ing future lost earnings.6 9 The court acknowledged that reinstatement
may not be an appropriate remedy in every section 301 suit. The court ex-
plained:
Reinstatement still may not be the appropriate form of prospective
relief in this case, however, for it may be that the six year delay
since discharge has made reinstatement impractical both for the
Company and for the plaintiffs, particularly if the present senior-
ity clause is a weak one which is likely to generate future contro-
versy concerning these employees. If such impracticality exists, we
can see no reason why an award for future lost earnings would not
be in order, provided they are apportioned between the Union and
the employer along the guidelines of Vaca v. Sipes .... and Czosek
v. O'Mara .... Moreover, we think it makes good sense to give the
district court an alternative to reinstatement in those cases where
some prospective relief is warranted. The admittedly difficult
problems of quantifying future lost earnings should not be allowed
to preclude any prospective remedy or to force the parties to ac-
cept the more drastic remedy of reinstatement. Of course, the
employee will only be entitled to recover from the Company for
those damages which are reasonably attributable to the discharge
and which could not have been mitigated by engaging in substan-
tially equivalent employment.7 0
Thus, the court remanded this aspect of the damages question to the dis-
trict court for the purpose of producing further evidence.
The court also discussed plaintiffs' request for an award of reasonable
attorney's fees. While noting that such relief is possible in a section 301
suit, the court held that the circumstances in the case precluded such
relief. The court noted, however, that "[n]ormally such relief should be
charged against the Union, for its failure to utilize the grievance procedure
on the employee's behalf is what necessitated his resort to the Courts.17 '
De Arroyo reflects an attempt to articulate and assess liability in the
context of unfair representation by the union and a corresponding viola-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement by the employer. The court
correctly framed the issue in analyzing the proper allocation of retrospec-
tive damages, future lost earnings, and the award of attorney's fees. The
court's attempt to allocate the damages according to the precipitating
cause reflects an understanding of the apportionment principle an-
nounced in Vaca. The court properly applied that analysis in analyzing
and allocating the cost of attorney's fees and future lost earnings. In an at-
tempt to make the employees whole, the court, however, in analyzing the
69. Id. at 291.
70. Id. at 292.
71. Id. at 293.
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apportionment of retrospective damages, apparently ignored the factor it
found convincing with respect to attorney's fees: the union's failure to
utilize grievance procedures. Is the analysis applicable to the attorney's
fees question equally appropriate with respect to retroactive relief?
In Holodnak v. Avco Corp. ,72 a discharged employee brought an ac-
tion against the employer and the union challenging his dismissal for
publishing an article critical of company and union practices. In an opin-
ion by Judge Lumbard, sitting by designation at the district court level, the
decision of the arbitrator which upheld the plaintiffs dismissal was re-
versed on the ground of the arbitrator's bias. The court found that the
union had breached its duty of fair representation because of the perfunc-
tory manner in which it handled the representation of the discharged
employee at the arbitration hearing. Specifically, the court held that the
union's representation of Holodnak "was sadly lacking and was arbi-
trary."' s In assessing Holodnak's claim under section 301, the court held
that his discharge was not for just cause because it was due to his exercise of
rights protected by the first amendment. Recognizing that the first
amendment protections do not infringe upon the rights of a private
employer, the court nonetheless found sufficient "state action" in the com-
pany's status as a major defense contractor.
Holodnak sought reinstatement, back wages, punitive damages for
willful discharge, and attorney's fees. Finding Holodnak was under a duty
to mitigate damages, the court awarded him $9,113.24 in back pay. In
assessing the apportionment of damages between the employer and the
union, the court found damages were attributable solely to the employer
"[s]ince essentially all the loss suffered here was due to Avco's improper
discharge of the plaintiff. '74 As to punitive damages, the plaintiff was
awarded $10,000.00 because Avco had acted willfully in its discharge of
Holodnak contrary to his constitutional rights. The court rejected Holod-
nak's request for reinstatement, finding that his apparent failure to seek
work for several years and poor physical condition provided no basis for
ordering reinstatement.
As for Holodnak's request for attorney's fees, the court held that such
an award was proper, but questioned how such fees were to be allocated.
In this vein, the court reasoned:
While violation of Holodnak's rights was caused primarily by
Avco's actions, it cannot be said that the union's breach of its duty
of fair representation did not contribute to Holodnak's need for
counsel to assert his rights. On all the circumstances of the case, a
72. 381 F. Supp. 191 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 514
F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975).
73. Id. at 201.
74. Id. at 205.
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fair apportionment of the liability for counsel fees and expenses is
that Avco pay two-thirds and the union one-third. 7 5
The court in Holodnak, as had the First Circuit in De Arroyo, cited
Vaca and its guidance as to the appropriate apportionment of liability in
this context, but failed to apply the analysis with respect to the proper
allocation of retrospective monetary relief (i.e., back wages). In De Ar-
royo, unlike Holodnak, the court appeared ready and willing to apply the
Vaca analysis to back pay, but did not do so because of the application of
the statute of limitations for tort actions. The Holodnak decision never
even intimated that the analysis required a more rigorous examination of
the appropriate causation resulting in relief for back pay. The Holodnak
court was satisfied that the resulting damages from the discharge were
essentially attributable to Avco's actions. The failure to apply the analysis
pursued with respect to the attorney's fees to the award of back wages
reflects an unexpressed judicial preference in Holodnak to protect the
union from such liability. How else can the apparent inconsistent applica-
tion of the analysis be explained when one compares the back pay award
with the award of attorney's fees? If the Holodnak finding of the union's
failure in its duty of fair representation (in that it did not rigorously repre-
sent its members' interests at arbitration) is to be given weight, the union
should be held equally liable for the resulting back pay damages caused by
the discharge.
VII. HINES V. ANCHOR MOTOR FREIGHT, INC.: AN EXTENSION
OF THE EMPLOYER'S POTENTIAL LIABILITY
In 1976 the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Hines v.
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 76 addressed the question of whether a union's
75. Id. at 206. On review, the district court's decision was affirmed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in all respects except for the
award of punitive damages against the employer. 514 F.2d at 293. The appellate
court did not discuss the apportionment of damages in its decision.
76. 424 U.S. 554 (1976). For a brief commentary discussing both the Vaca
and Hines decisions, see Comment, Duty of Fair Representation- Consequences
for Breach, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 1042 (1976). The Comment reviews
the Hines decision favorably:
It is submitted that the majority reached the correct result in extend-
ing a judicial remedy to employees who have been unfairly represented
in the arbitration process. In Hines, The Court was faced with three dis-
tinct interests: the employees' interest in obtaining a fair forum to pre-
sent breach of contract claims against the employer; the employer's
interest in freedom from multiple exposure to litigation; and the public
interest in maintaining the legitimacy and usefulness of the collective
bargaining process. When all of these interests were examined in light of
[Vol. 46
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breach of its duty of fair representation would afford the employee a judi-
cial remedy against his employer, not, as in Vaca, where the union had
failed to process the grievance, but where the union had already exhausted
an arbitration process defined by the contract to be final and binding on
all parties. Petitioner-employees (truck drivers for Anchor Motor Freight)
were discharged by the company for alleged dishonesty in seeking reim-
bursement for money spent in overnight lodging. The practice at Anchor
Motor Freight was to reimburse drivers for money spent for lodging while
the drivers were on the road overnight. The company charged the peti-
tioners with having sought reimbursement for motel expenses in excess of
the actual charges sustained by them.
At a meeting between the company and the union, the company pre-
sented the evidence upon which it relied for its allegation of dishonesty.
Anchor presented motel receipts previously submitted by peti-
tioners which were in excess of the charges shown on the motel's
registration cards; a notorized statement of the motel clerk assert-
ing the accuracy of the registration cards; and an affidavit of the
motel owner affirming that the registration cards were accurate
and that inflated receipts had been furnished petitioners. 77
The union opposed the discharges claiming that the petitioners were inno-
cent. Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, the matter was sub-
mitted to a joint arbitration committee.
At the hearing before the joint arbitration committee, Anchor Motor
Freight presented evidence supporting its allegation of employee dis-
honesty. The petitioners denied their dishonesty, but neither they nor the
union presented any documentary evidence contradicting that relied upon
by the company. The committee sustained the discharges. Petitioners
sought a rehearing hoping to establish that the motel clerk was, in fact,
responsible for the discrepancy between the motel receipts presented to
Anchor Motor Freight by the employees and the charges shown on the
motel's registration cards. The committee denied the rehearing.
Petitioners then brought a wrongful discharge suit against the em-
ployer and union under section 301, 78 alleging that the falsity of the
charges could have been discovered with a minimum of investigation, but
that the union had made no effort to ascertain the truth and thereby had
violated its duty of fair representation by arbitrarily and in bad faith
depriving petitioners of their employment. The district court found no evi-
dence supporting a showing of bad faith, arbitrariness, or perfunctoriness
the policy encouraging final resolution of labor disputes through con-
tractual grievance procedures, the majority properly found the interests
of the employer to be the least compelling.
Id. at 1047-48.
77. 424 U.S. at 556.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
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on the union's part, and granted summary judgment for both the union
and the company on the ground that the arbitration committee's decision
was final and binding. 19 The court of appeals reversed the district court's
summary judgment as to the local union because it found that there were
sufficient facts from which to infer a possible violation of the union's duty
of fair representation. 0 However, the court affirmed the judgment in the
employer's favor finding that the finality provisions of the collective bar-
gaining agreement were controlling unless evidence demonstrated miscon-
duct by the employer or a conspiracy between it and the union.8 The
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision concerning the
employer, holding that if the petitioners could prove an erroneous dis-
charge and that the union's breach of duty of fair representation tainted
the arbitration committee's decision, then the petitioners were entitled to
an appropriate remedy against the employer as well as the union.
In its analysis of the issue presented, the Co4rt was confronted with the
conflicting interests of the individual employee in seeking fair representa-
tion and of the employer in preserving the finality of decisions pursuant to
the procedures embodied in the collective bargaining agreement. The
company argued that the petitioner-employees were foreclosed from judi-
cial relief, unless some blameworthy conduct on its part disentitled it to
rely on the finality provisions embodied in the contract and on the general
deference to the mechanism of dispute resolution chosen by the parties. In
its rejection of the company's argument, the Court was particularly influ-
enced by the fact that "it was Anchor that originated the charges for dis-
honesty. If those charges were in error, Anchor has surely played its part in
precipitating this dispute." 2 Recognizing the vital function of the finality
provision commonly found in collective bargaining agreements, the Court
noted that deference to such provisions requires "that the contractual
machinery... operate within some minimum levels of integrity."883 The
79. Hines v. Local 377, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 72 Lab. Cas. 28,
129 (N.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 506 F.2d 1153 (6th Cir.
1974), rev'd in part sub nom. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554
(1976).
80. Hines v. Local 377, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 506 F.2d 1153
(6th Cir. 1974), rev'd in part sub nom. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424
U.S. 554 (1976).
81. Id. at 1157. The court of appeals concluded that the finality provision of
collective-bargaining contracts must be observed because there was "[n]o evi-
dence of any misconduct on the part of the employer," and wholly insufficient
evidence of any conspiracy between the union and Anchor Motor Freight. Id.
The court of appeals relied primarily upon its prior opinion in Balowski v. In-
ternational Union, 372 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1967). The Balowski case held that an
employee could litigate his discharge in court if he proved bad faith or gross mis-
take on the part of either the union or the employer.
82. 424 U.S. at 569.
83. Id. at 571.
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Court found it quite another matter to suggest that erroneous arbitration
decisions must stand where "the process has fundamentally malfunctioned
by reason of the bad-faith performance of the union. '8 4
The Court was emphatic in its determination that the "enforcement of
the finality provision where the arbitrator has erred is conditioned upon
the union's having satisfied its statutory duty fairly to represent the
employee in connection with the arbitration proceedings."85 Particularly
germane to the Hines decision was the realization that "[w]rongfully dis-
charged employees would be left without jobs and without a fair oppor-
tunity to secure an adequate remedy"86 if the finality provision were
applied so as to preclude an aggrieved employee's suit against his employer
where the union has failed in its duty of fair representation. Therefore, the
Court held that the petitioners were entitled to an appropriate remedy
against the employer, as well as the union, if they could prove an erroneous
discharge and the union's breach of duty tainted the decision of the joint
committee.
Mr. Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, agreed with the Court
that proof of breach of the union's duty of fair representation would
remove the bar of finality from the joint committee's decision that Anchor
Motor did not wrongfully discharge the petitioners. However, according to
Mr. Justice Stewart's analysis, "this is not to say that proof of breach of the
Union's representation duty would render Anchor potentially liable for
backpay accruing between the time of the 'tainted' decision by the arbitra-
tion committee and a subsequent 'untainted' determination that the dis-
charges were, after all, wrongful. '87 Then, in what is the most helpful
clarification of the apportionment principle of liability announced in
Vaca, Mr. Justice Stewart explained why the employer should not be held
liable for back pay for that period in which he relied, in good faith, on the
determination of the arbitrator that the discharge was proper. He ex-
plained:
If an employer relies in good faith on a favorable arbitral deci-
sion, then his failure to reinstate discharged employees cannot be
anything but rightful, until there is a contrary determination. Lia-
bility for the intervening wage loss must fall not on the employer
but on the union. Such an apportionment of damages is mandated
by Vaca's holding that "damages attributable solely to the em-
ployer's breach of contract should not be charged to the union, but
increases if any of those damages caused the union's refusal to pro-
cess the grievance should not be charged to the employer.". . .To




87. Id. at 572-73 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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which he rightfully refuses to rehire discharged employees would
be to charge him with a contractual violation on the basis of con-
duct precisely in accord with the dictates of the collective agree-
ment. 88
The dissent, authored by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, with whom Chief
Justice Burger joined, argued that the union's breach of its duty of fair
representation was an insufficient reason to void an otherwise valid arbi-
tration decision in favor of the employer. Justice Rehnquist urged that
Vaca allowed an employee to turn to the courts only when the union had
prevented him from taking his grievance to arbitration. According to the
dissent, "the existence of a final arbitration decision is the crucial dif-
ference between this case and Vaca." 8 9 The dissent considered the fact
that the employee has an independent remedy against the union for the
breach of its duty of fair representation, and therefore concluded that to
provide for a judicial remedy against the employer in these circumstances
was "anomalous and contrary to the longstanding policy of this Court
favoring the finality of arbitration awards." 90 The dissent concluded:
Now the employer, which concededly acted in good faith
throughout these proceedings, is to be subjected to a damages suit
because of the Union's alleged misconduct. In view of the fact that
petitioners have an action for damages against the Union .... this
additional remedy against the employer seems both undesirable
and unnecessary.9 1
VIII. LOWER COURTS IMPOSING JOINT AND SEVERAL
LIABILITY ON THE EMPLOYER AND UNION
It is not uncommon in this context for the courts to impose joint and
several liability upon the employer and the union. Often, this is accom-
plished with little or no discussion of the standard announced in Vaca.2 In
Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 93 however, the proper allocation of
liability was thoroughly discussed.
88. Id. at 573 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
89. Id. at 575 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 574 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See generally St. Antoine,Judicial
Review offLabor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its
Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137 (1977).
91. 424 U.S. at 576 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). See
Coulson, Vaca v. Sipes Illegitimate Child: The Impact ofAnchor Motor Freight on
the Finality Doctrine in Grievances Arbitration, 10 GA. L. REV. 693 (1976). The
Article criticizesHines as a dilution of the traditional adversary nature ofgrievance
arbitration, and suggests that employers bargain for a specific provision protecting
them from liability in these suits. Would the courts honor the provision?
92. See, e.g., Peterson v. Rath Packing Co., 461 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1972).
93. 96 L.R.R.M. 2822 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
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The plaintiff in Ruzicka was discharged for intoxication on the job and
for using threatening and abusive language toward his superior. He filed a
grievance with the union seeking reinstatement. Tfie union processed the
grievance through step two of the process, but negligently failed to file a
timely statement of the grievance pursuant to step three. The company
relied on the finality provisions in the contract and refused to process the
grievance further.
In a section 301 suit, the plaintiff sued the employer for wrongful dis-
charge and the union for breach of its duty of fair representation. The dis-
trict court dismissed the complaint finding there was no breach of duty by
the union.9 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
that the local union's failure to take the required steps toward arbitration
of a grievance constituted a breach of its duty of fair representation not-
withstanding the fact that it was not motivated by bad faith.95 The appel-
late court remanded the case to the district level, ordering that the case be
referred to arbitration and that the district court should retain jurisdiction
to award relief against the union on the unfair representation claim.
In the appellate court's opinion, authored by Judge Celebrezze, the
issue of the allocation of liability was discussed as follows:
Appellant's complaint asserts that GM and the Unions are
jointly and severally liable for his injury. This is not true. When a
union breaches its duty of fair representation, the employer re-
mains liable for any damages "attributable solely to the employer's
breach of contract," i.e., the wrongful discharge. Vaca [v. Sipes]
When a breach of the duty of fair representation is shown,
however, the Union is liable for that portion of Appellant's injury
representing "increases if any in those damages [chargeable to the
employer] caused by the union's refusal to process the grievance."
Vaca [v. Sipes] .... Thus, upon a finding of unfair representa-
tion, "the court must fashion an appropriate remedy," . . . com-
pensating Appellant from the Union's pocket for those expenses he
incurred because of the Union's failure to process his grievance
properly. 96
On remand the district court ordered arbitration, and the arbitrator
subsequently found the discharge of the plaintiff wrongful and violative of
the collective bargaining agreement.9 7 The district court accepted the
arbitration findings and also found that the union had failed to exercise its
duty of fair representation.9 8 The court then considered the appropriate
94. Ruzickav. General Motors Corp., 86 L.R.R.M. 2030, 2031 (E.D. Mich.
1973), rev'd, 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975).
95. 523 F.2d 306, 310 (6th Cir. 1975).
96. Id. at 312.
97. 96 L.R.R.M. 2822, 2828 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
98. Id. at 2828, 2830.
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apportionment of liability. The union argued that the company should be
liable for all damages flowing from Ruzicka's discharge. The union main-
tained that the company was wholly at fault because it had wrongfully
discharged Ruzicka and had refused to process the grievance for reinstate-
ment.
The company responded that the union was liable for all damages
from the time that it breached its duty of fair representation. It reasoned
that had it not been for the union's breach of its duty, the wrongful dis-
charge would have been rectified by a favorable award (i.e., reinstate-
ment) at arbitration. The company relied on the reasoning expressed in
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,
Inc. 9
9
After due consideration of the arguments offered by the union and
company in assessing the proper apportionment of liability, the trial court
announced a finding of joint liability based on an analysis which at-
tempted to balance the respective positions of the parties. The court found
the formulae offered by the parties to be based almost wholly on the se-
quence or timing of their respective acts toward the discharged employee.
The court recognized the offered formulae to be plausible and apparently
supported in the cases, but found each analysis to be myopic. In assessing
joint liability, the court reasoned:
It was the combined effect of General Motors' wrongful discharge
and the Union's breach of duty of fair representation which has
operated all of these years to deprive plaintiff of his job with the
Company and his rights under the contract, and the Court is not
about to apportion damages by trying to determine which tooth of
this buzz saw was responsible, at any given moment, for the
damages plaintiff was incurring at the time. The Court believes
that a proper apportionment of damages must consider not only
the chronology of the defendants' wrongful acts but also the grav-
ity and nature of their wrongdoing. Each defendant contributed
in its own way to the injuries suffered by plaintiff, and each must
answer for damages accordingly. 100
Another case illustrative of the inclination of some courts to award
joint and several liability of both the employer and the union is Freeman v.
O'Neal Steel, Inc. 101 In Freeman, the plaintiff was discharged because of
his involvement in an altercation that took place during working hours.
99. 424 U.S. at 572-73 (Stewart, J., concurring).
100. 96 L.R.R.M. at 2837.
101. 436 F. Supp. 607 (N.D. Ala. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 609 F.2d
1123 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Farmer v. Hotel Workers Local 1064, 99 L.R.R.M.
2166 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (holding that the union may be held jointly and severally
liable with the employer, or that damages may be apportioned to the extent that
the union shares responsibility for the damages).
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The collective bargaining agreement contained a grievance procedure
consisting of three steps, and a right of appeal to arbitration. When the
plaintiff filed his grievance with the union, the union pursued the griev-
ance up to arbitration, but decided not to take the grievance through the
arbitration process.
Plaintiff filed a section 301 suit alleging a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement in the employer's wrongful discharge, and a viola-
tion of the union's duty of fair representation by failing to take his griev-
ance to arbitration. The court found that it was arbitrary for the union not
to proceed to arbitration and that the union's representative had exhibited
personal hostility based on race against the plaintiff. Thus, the union had
breached its duty of fair representation. As for the wrongful discharge
allegation, the court found the discharge to be improper, noting that the
plaintiff had a right to be involved in the altercation.
In assessing the appropriate remedy and the apportionment of liabil-
ity, the court cited Vaca and found that under these circumstances it was
proper to hold both parties jointly and severally liable. The court analyzed
the issue of apportionment of liability in the following manner:
The appropriate remedy for an employer's breach of the employ-
ment contract and for a breach of a union's duty of fair representa-
tion must vary with the circumstances of the particular breach.
The difficulty here, as in the Vaca case, lies in fashioning an
appropriate scheme of remedies. It is the court's opinion that both
the union and O'Neal are equally culpable in their wrongful ac-
tions toward the plaintiff. Accordingly, the court holds the union
and O'Neal jointly and severally liable for any amount of damages
awarded to the plaintiff. In this regard the court is of the opinion
that the plaintiff is entitled to reinstatement to his employment
with O'Neal Steel, payment of all back damages (less wages earned
from other employment) from the time of his discharge to present,
payment of back contributions to O'Neal's pension fund and
credit of all time from plaintiff's wrongful discharge to the present
toward obtaining a vested interest in that pension fund and, finally
seniority as if the plaintiff had suffered no termination of employ-
ment from O'Neal Steel. 102
102. 436 F. Supp. at 613. The district court's decision was reversed by the
Fifth Circuit. 609 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1980). The appellate court, on reviewing all
the evidence, found that there was not substantial evidence to support the district
court finding that the union had failed in its duty of fair representation. Accord-
ingly, the appellate court never reached the question of wrongful discharge by the
employer and the apportionment of liability. Id. at 1128. Nevertheless, the dis-
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IX. JUDICIAL CONFUSION IN APPLYING THE VA CA-HINES
PRINCIPLE OF APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY
The apportionment of liability between the union and the employer as
announced in Vaca v. Sipes and elucidated upon in Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc. continues to trouble the courts. Two recent federal
court decisions reveal the continuing confusion -the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia decision in Chambers v. Local 639,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 103 and the Seventh Circuit deci-
sion in Battle v. Clark Equipment Co. 10 4
In Chambers,0 5 the court considered the plaintiff-employees' section
301 suit against their employer (Kane) and the union charging that the
defendants were jointly liable to them for damages; the employees alleged
that the employer had breached the collective bargaining agreement by
denying them work to which they were entitled by their seniority status
under the collective bargaining agreement, and that the union had failed
to properly represent them. At the heart of the case was the accommoda-
tion of seniority rosters from two separate plants. In March of 1973, the
plaintiff-employees were laid off by Kane from their jobs at Tuxedo,
Maryland. Kane had a contract account with another company, Grand
Union. The plaintiff-employees discharged from the Tuxedo plant sought
to bump into the seniority roster at the Grand Union plant and thus
displace drivers there who had less seniority. When the Tuxedo employees
were denied the opportunity to bump into the Grand Union plant, they
sought relief through the grievance procedure. In a grievance hearing held
in April of 1973, it was decided that the plaintiff-employees were entitled
to employment at Grand Union. By September of 1973, plaintiff-
employees realized from their workweek assignments that they had not ob-
tained the priority and seniority originally requested. Through the union,
they brought a second grievance attempting to establish their priority
status with respect to work assignments. That second grievance was re-
solved contrary to the plaintiff-employees' request. The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found evidence that the
union may well have breached its duty of fair representation in seeking a
second grievance decision contrary to the finding of the first grievance
hearing. The court noted: "This adverse decision to appellants' claims
represented the culmination of all the defects in [the] representation of
which appellants complain[ed]."106
In its analysis of the employer's liability, the court acknowledged that
103. 578 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
104. 579 F.2d 1338 (7th Cir. 1978).
105. 578 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
106. Id. at 387.
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its decision did not rest upon an imputation of bad faith to the company.
The court observed:
From the very start, Kane expressed no serious interest in the
seniority merger one way or the other, so long as the matter was
resolved amicably with the employees. But labor-management
contracts create rights in individual employees, not just labor
unions and employers; and those rights can be enforced in courts
of law. 1 0
7
The court proceeded to hold that "[w]hen the employer relies on the ad-
vice and interpretation of a labor union to the detriment of an employee, it
does so at its own risk, subject to an apportionment of any liability between
itself and the Union."108 The court found that the employer, Kane, was
liable to plaintiff-employees for not granting them the dovetail seniority at
the Grand Union plant. 09 The court expressly left open the possibility of
joint liability of the employer and the union, noting that its analysis as to
whether the doctrine of exhaustion of internal remedies applied would not
necessarily result in the union's liability for damages based on a violation of
the collective bargaining agreement." 0
107. Id. at 380.
108. Id. In note 3 on the same page of the opinion, the court reasoned that
good faith reliance of an employer upon a union's representations does not pro-
tect the employer from liability: "If this were not so, no union-shop employee
could seek reinstatement after being discharged in good faith by an employer who
relied on a union's erroneous allegation that the employee had failed to pay dues,
since only the company can provide reinstatement." Id. at 380 n.3.
109. Id. at 383. The court reasoned:
Though without malice throughout the proceeding, it was Kane that,
in the end, denied the plaintiff employees the benefit of their favorable
decision on the 1973 grievance. Kane had agreed to this decision, and it
was Kane who was bound by the collective bargaining contract to honor
the 1973 decision as final .... We accordingly conclude (1) that the
judgment of the district court was clearly erroneous in ordering summary
judgment for Kane, (2) that Kane is liable to appellants for not granting
them the dovetailed seniority at Grand Union that is clearly called for by
the collective bargaining contract, (3) that the judgment should be
vacated, and (4) the case remanded to the district court to determine the
amount of damages as further outlined in the following discussion of the
case against the union.
Id.
110. Id. at 388. The court discussed in some detail the possibility of joint
liability:
We do not, however, suggest that summary reversal in the appellants'
favor should be granted, but merely that the judgment in the union's
favor should be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for
trial on the merits of appellants' claim that the union violated its obliga-
tions to appellants as alleged in the complaint. We recognize that the
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In Battle v. Clark Eguipment Co. ,III the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit considered whether an employer could be
held liable for retroactive monetary relief when it relied in good faith on
the union's representations of its actions in the process of amending the
collective bargaining agreement. The dispute arose from actions taken by
the company and the union upon the closing of the company's trailer divi-
sion in Michigan City, Indiana. The collective bargaining agreement con-
tained a supplemental unemployment plan (SUB plan) that provided for
regular weekly benefits payable to any qualified employee laid off during
the course of employment. The union had requested an amendment to the
SUB plan so that the distribution of the funds could be based on a pro rata
basis according to accrued seniority status.
The plaintiff-employees sued the union for failure to carry out its duty
of fair representation, alleging that their signatures in support of the
amendment were obtained by fraudulent misrepresentations. In addition,
the plaintiff-employees sued the company under section 301, arguing that
the SUB plan amendment was improperly executed and ratified by the
union, and that the company's failure to pay them the benefits due under
the original plan constituted a breach of contract.
In its analysis of the employees' suit against the employer, the court
found the distinguishing characteristic to be that these claims did "not rest
on any allegations of misconduct by the company other than the ... [com-
pany's] acquiescence in the union's demands for a modification of the SUB
plan."11 2 Although the court found that the plaintiff-employees' claim
union is in a very difficult position, but the case against it involves a
number of genuine issues of fact that, as yet, have not been proved. The
alleged participation of the union in violating appellants' rights is a more
complex question than the violation by the company. The case against
the company is essentially completed by our interpretation of the senior-
ity clause of the agreement and by the admission that Kane denied ap-
pellants the dovetailed company seniority at Grand Union that they were
entitled to. The case against the union, however, depends upon proof of
a number of additional acts by those acting for the union and in some in-
stances the intent with which those acts were committed. It will also be
necessary, if the court finds that the union isjointly liable, to take evi-
dence in order properly to apportion the damages with Kane. In decid-
ing that the appellants need not exhaust their internal union remedies,
we do not determine that the union has in fact breached its duty of fair
representation to them or illegally interfered with their contractual
rights. We hold only that this action should not be barred by appellants'
failure to exhaust the union grievance mechanisms, and remand the case
so that they may have the full hearing on their claim to which they are
entitled.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
111. 579 F.2d 1338 (7th Cir. 1978).
112. Id. at 1345. The court stated:
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against the union raised the question of fraud and bad faith on the part of
union leaders, it determined that the plaintiff-employees could not rely
upon the union misconduct to obtain relief against the company.
The court reasoned that the status of the union as exclusive bargaining
agent of all employees within the unit necessitated that the employer
bargain in good faith with the union. As a corollary, the court found that
"the employer cannot be held liable for retroactive monetary relief when it
relies in good faith on union actions or representations that are not obvi-
ously outside the scope of its authority.' 1 3 As to the employer's liability,
the court reasoned in relevant part:
In the instant case there is no showing of independent wrongdoing
by the employer, who was essentially a neutral stakeholder with
regard to the SUB plan fund. We do not believe that in enacting
Section 301(a) Congress intended to permit the awarding of retro-
active monetary relief against an employer whose only fault has
been to rely in good faith on the representations of the union
leaders that the union membership had properly ratified the
amendments. In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight ... (Stewart, J.,
concurring), it was suggested that even if there were an eventual
determination of wrongful discharge of the plaintiff, the employer
should not be held liable for back pay for that period in which he
was relying in good faith on the determination of the arbitrator
that the discharge was proper." 4
The analysis and conclusion employed by the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit in Chambers v. Local 639, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters,11r and the Seventh Circuit in Battle v. Clark Equipment Co. 116 illus-
trate that the judicial decisions which result in this context depend in large
Appellants' claims against the company are primarily based on the
contention that the amendment to the SUB plan was improperly ex-
ecuted and ratified and that therefore the company must accord them
their rights under the premodification agreement. The first allegation of
impropriety is that by asking the company to agree to an amendment to
the SUB plan the union violated the "zipper clause" contained in Article
XXV of the collective bargaining agreement which prohibits either
party from requesting any change in the SUB plan during the life of the
collective bargaining agreement. Secondly, there is a contention that the
nature of the changes in the SUB plan sought by the union and agreed to
by the company manifest such a disregard of the interests of the appel-
lants as to constitute a breach by the union of its duty of fair representa-
tion. Lastly, appellants allege that the local union leaders engaged in
fraud and improper conduct in the way in which they ran the January 5
meeting and gathered the ratification signatures.
Id. (footnote omitted).
113. Id. at 1349.
114. Id. at 1349-50.
115. 578 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
116. 579 F.2d 1338 (7th Cir. 1978).
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part on a given court's unarticulated balancing of the interests of em-
ployee, union, employer, and society. In both cases, the employer was
characterized as a neutral or innocent party who simply acquiesced in a
union's desire to modify an existing term of the collective bargaining
agreement. The Chambers court chose to impose financial responsibility
on the employer for the consequences of his acquiescence; the Battle court
chose to relieve the employer of such responsibility.
The Chambers court found the attendant financial responsibility of
the employer by emphasizing the rights of individual employees in the col-
lective bargaining agreement negotiated by the union and agreed to by the
employer. As such, Chambers reflects a judicial preference in the empha-
sis of an individual's rights which adhere in the collective bargaining
agreement. Unlike the court in Battle, the Chambers court was not par-
ticularly concerned with the employer's reliance on the union's representa-
tion in its role as the exclusive bargaining agent of its members. The fact
that the employer was a party to the modified seniority status plan consti-
tuted a sufficient basis upon which the court predicated employee relief.
The analysis of Chambers is susceptible to criticism because the court
focused upon the employment relationship to the exclusion of any con-
sideration of the integral part played by the union's failure to exercise its
duty of fair representation. By assessing liability without proper considera-
tion of the union's failure, the Chambers court protected the union from
liability for its failure to represent adequately.
X. THE JUDICIAL PREDILECTION IDENTIFIED,
ANALYZED, AND EVALUATED
In the seminal case of Vaca v. Sipes n 7 the Supreme Court confronted
the issue of what avenues an aggrieved employee could seek to attempt to
gain reinstatement and back pay for his discharge. The majority opinion,
the concurring opinion, and the dissenting opinion each viewed the indi-
vidual's rights differently. Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion articu-
lated the position that the employee had the absolute right to pursue his
discharge action for breach of contract against the employer in court." 8
Mr. Justice Fortas, in his concurring opinion,"19 found such a right to
be nonexistent because the matter was preempted by national labor policy
and the jurisdiction for such a case was vested solely in the NLRB. Mr.
Justice White, speaking for the majority of the Court in Vaca, espoused
117. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
118. Id. at 203 (Black, J., dissenting). See notes 46 & 47 and accompanying
text supra.
119. Id. at 198-203 (Fortas, J., concurring).
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and established an intermediate position whereby the employee must at-
tempt to exhaust the internal remedies provided for by the union unless
such an attempt would be futile. 120 Once that has been established, the
employee, unsuccessful through the grievance and arbitration procedure,
may pursue his remedy in court. The employee may join the employer and
the union as codefendants, seeking relief against the employer for wrong-
ful discharge and against the union for its failure to carry out the duty of
fair representation. In establishing such a case, however, the employee
must first establish a breach in the union's duty of fair representation.
Only then is the employee free to establish the wrongful discharge suit
against the employer.
The virtue of the intermediate approach is that it provides the em-
ployer with a needed buffer tool, the union's duty of fair representation.
This is a very practical and valid buffer because it is with the union that the
employer bargains and it is upon the union that the employer relies. Such
reliance is essential to the collective bargaining agreement. Without it, the
employer bargains for nothing. Without it, the mechanism to effect the
peaceful resolution of labor disputes is destroyed.
The employer's reliance upon the union's buffer cannot be employed
to frustrate the employee's request for relief. The Supreme Court emphati-
cally held this to be so in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. 121 Thus, the
Court struck a balance in favor of the individual employee who may be
considered to have been the innocent party. How can the employer be ex-
cluded from the remedial order of the court when it is the employment
relationship which is at the heart of the employee's request for relief? It is
this wiiter's belief that few would contest that the employee's interest in
reinstatement is more highly valued than the employer's interest in the
finality of the grievance procedure embodied in the collective bargaining
agreement. Although reinstatement is a proper remedy if the discharge is
later determined to have been wrongful, the reasoning with respect to that
issue is not equally applicable to an analysis of the attendant liability for
back pay as apportioned between the union and employer.
The problem lies in the courts' failure to adequately identify and
articulate the identifiable interests which adhere in this context of com-
peting interests. This inarticulate approach is a reflection of the judicial
120. Id. at 184. The Court instructed:
Since the employee's claim is based upon breach of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, he is bound by terms of that agreement which
govern the manner in which contractual rights may be enforced. For this
reason, it is settled that the employee must at least attempt to exhaust ex-
clusive grievance and arbitration procedures established by the bargain-
ing agreement ....
Id. (citation omitted).
121. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
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reluctance to express underlying policy considerations. Only if the courts
are willing to articulate the priority of the individual employee's interests
vis-a-vis the union and the employer, and the union's interests vis-a-vis the
employer, will the student of this area come to understand the underlying
considerations that persuade the courts. Perhaps the reluctance of the
courts to expressly identify and attach values to the competing interests is
simply a reflection of the inherent difficulty of such an assessment when
the values to be assigned differ as societal priorities change. Obviously, dif-
ferent facts (for example, the actions and assets of the union, the actions
and assets of the company, and the attractiveness of the employee's request
for relief) necessarily justify dissimilar results.
With few exceptions, however, the cases reflect a judicial predilection
to assign the attendant liability resulting from an employee's discharge to
the employer. Perhaps the best analog in the law for purposes of this analy-
sis is that of strict liability in tort law. 22 In tort law, the doctrine of strict
liability evolved and developed to its present status because of the judicial
desire to provide the injured party with relief. Similarly, in the area of
labor law, when the union and the employer are joined as codefendants
the courts desire to provide relief to the injured plaintiff. In assessing the
alternatives, the courts have restricted their analysis to whether the union
122. Strict liability may be defined as liability without fault. See Prosser, The
Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791
(1966). See generally Judge Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 882, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); Comment, The Continuing
Development of Strict Liability in Tort, 22 ARK. L. REV. 233 (1968).
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) has proven to be signifi-
cant in the development of the law in many jurisdictions which have adopted the
concept of strict liability. Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
It should be noted that the concept of "fault," in the term "liability without
fault," carries with it no meaning of moral fault. Rather, in balancing social
equities, the loss has been shifted by law from the plaintiff to the defendant. This
is because the courts have found that the defendant can better bear the cost. See
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or the employer should bear the burden of liability.1 23 Without great dis-
cussion, the courts appear to inexorably assign the resulting liability to the
employer's discharge. The courts reason that it is the discharge which
causes the resulting liability-that is, the employee's loss of employment
and loss of wages. Why are the courts so reluctant to assign to the union its
apportioned share of liability?
The reluctance stems from an unspoken belief that the cost can be bet-
ter handled by the employer than by the union. Just as in the strict liability
analysis of tort law, there is the recognition that the employer can pass on
the cost of the product to the consumer, and thus to society at large. When
confronted with the dilemma of providing the employee with a "make
whole" remedy, the courts often find the employer the most appropriate
choice. Perhaps this lies in the assumption that should the union pass on its
costs of operating as a union, this would merely penalize the members of
the union, the class which the NLRA seeks to protect, as found in sections
7 and 9 of the NLRA.1 24 At least by assessing the cost to the em-
ployer, there is the recognition that the employer will simply pass on the
cost to his consumers in the market price of products and services. Thus,
the aggrieved employee is provided with a remedy.
The limitation of this analysis by the courts is that it fails to appreciate
the positive effect such damage suits would have on union activity. It can
be persuasively argued that it is only by recognizing union liability through
damage awards that unions will truly act without arbitrariness, bad faith,
and perfunctoriness when confronted with an individual employee's griev-
ance. Such damage suits would add vitality to the union's duty of fair
representation. This vitality is necessary in light of the union's unique
status as the exclusive bargaining agent.
The judicial predilection to protect unions against large damage suits
is exemplified by the Supreme Court's 1979 decision in IBEW v. Foust.125
In Foust, it was held that the Railway Labor Act 126 does not permit an
123. One approach ignored by the judicial opinions on the subject is to pro-
vide the employee with reinstatement, but if there is an internal union appellate
procedure which was available but not utilized by the employee, to let the loss of
retroactivity for which the defendant (union or employer) would otherwise be
liable fall upon the employee. This approach was suggested in Feller, A General
Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663, 822
(1973). This approach rejects the finding that failure to exhaust union appellate
procedures bars suit entirely. See generally Fox & Sonenthal, Section 301 and Ex-
haustion of Intra-Union Appeals: A Misbegotten Marriage, 128 U. PA. L. REV.
989 (1980); Comment, The Exhaustion of Internal Union Remedies as a Pre-
requisite to Section 301 Actions Against Labor Unions and Employers, 55 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 259 (1979).
124. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 159 (1976).
125. 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
126. 45 U.S.C. § 8 (1976).
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employee to recover punitive damages against a union that breaches its
duty of fair representation by failing properly to pursue a grievance. Thus,
the Court reversed the Tenth Circuit ruling 27 that punitive damages were
appropriate if the union had acted wantonly or in reckless disregard of an
employee's rights.
Mr. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, cited several reasons for
the Court's finding that punitive damages in unfair representation suits
are per se inconsistent with federal labor policy. The Court examined the
issue of punitive damages in light of its function "to implement a remedial
scheme that will best effectuate the purposes of the Railway Labor Act,
recognizing that the overarching legislative goal is to facilitate collective
bargaining and to achieve industrial peace."' 28 The argument that a
strong legal remedy against the union was necessary to encourage unfair
representation suits and thereby inhibit union misconduct was rejected.
The Court found that "offsetting these potential benefits is the possibility
that punitive awards could impair the financial stability of unions and
unsettle the careful balance of individual and collective interests which
this Court has previously articulated in the unfair representation area."' 29
Mr. Justice Marshall explained the judicial solicitude for the financial
stability of unions as follows:
This limitation on union liability thus reflects an attempt to
afford individual employees redress for injuries caused by union
misconduct without compromising the collective interests of union
members in protecting limited funds. To permit punitive damages
• . . could undermine this careful accommodation. . . . Such
awards could deplete union treasuries, thereby impairing the ef-
fectiveness of unions as collective-bargaining agents. Inflicting this
risk on employees, whose welfare depends upon the strength of
their union, is simply too great a price for whatever deterrent
effect punitive damages may have. 3 0
The concern for the possible impairment of the financial stability of
unions and the careful balance of competing interests referred to by Mr.
Justice Marshall in Foust is indicative of the underlying policy considera-
tions that influence the courts in fashioning an appropriate remedy for the
aggrieved individual employee. The judicial tendency to assess all, or a
substantial amount, of the financial damage incurred by the employee
against the employer, however, fails to recognize other valid, overriding
interests. To simply saddle an employer with the financial liability result-
ing from a union's failure of duty runs contrary to sound legal analysis and
public policy.
127. Foust v. IBEW, 572 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 42
(1979).
128. 442 U.S. at 47.
129. Id. at 48.
130. Id. at 50-51 (citations omitted).
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The present state of the law in assessing employee liability essentially
has the effect of imposing on the employer, as well as the union, the duty of
fair representation. The thrust of this analysis of an employer's liability is
to replace the classic arms' length posture of the parties at the bargaining
table with a fiduciary standard. 131 The case law assessing employers' liabil-
ity for union unfair representation discards bargaining reality for fiduciary
duty.
Such a policy deprives the employer of the quid pro quo of his bargain.
In an attempt to assure the aggrieved worker of a "make whole" remedy,
the national labor policy of encouraging the parties (employer and union)
to settle their differences according to the terms of the collective bargain-
ing agreement is violated.13 2 The remedy authorized by Vaca "imposes a
greater alteration on the contractual arrangement by construing the sub-
stantive provisions of the collective agreement as an individual contract
divorced from the procedures and remedies contained in the grievance
and arbitration provisions. s1 3 3 It fails to appreciate the integral nature of
the two.13 4 This basic failure to conceptualize properly the nature of the
collective bargaining agreement and the administration of the agreement
underlies the judicial confusion in apportioning damages.
Basic legal principles for the breach of contract and the resulting
damages attributable to the breach require the injured party to mitigate
his damages by taking appropriate corrective action as soon as possible.1 3 5
An analysis of liability for negligence under tort law recognizes causation
as the determinative factor in assessing liability.13 6 Within that model, an
intervening cause that supplements the original cause necessitates an ap-
portionment of the resulting liability. If in the difficult factual determina-
131. See Edwards, Employer's Liability for Union Unfair Representation:'
Fiduciary Duty or Bargaining Reality?, 27 LAB. L.J. 686 (1976). Professor Archi-
bald Cox has suggested that the collective bargaining agreement be compared to
a trust under which the union holds the employer's promises as a fiduciary for the
individual employees. That theory, as well as others, is rejected by Professor Cox
as a basis for decision in certain types of cases. See Cox, The Legal Nature of Col-
lective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MICH. L. REV. 1, 21 (1958).
132. The Supreme Court has long recognized the desirability of encouraging
parties to settle their differences according to the terms of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. See also authorities cited notes 7 & 55 supra.
133. Feller, supra note 123, at 819.
134. Id.
135. The duty to mitigate damages has generally been applied to § 301 ac-
tions involving a union's failure in its duty of fair representation. See, e.g., De
Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 292 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
136. See, e.g., Judge Cardozo's opinion and Judge Andrews' dissent in Pals-
grafv. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). See generallyJames
& Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761 (1951).
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tion of causation there can be no clear differentiation of causation, then
joint and several liability is applied under a joint tortfeasor analysis.
The judicial concern for the depletion of union treasuries assumes the
effect of depletion would be to impair the effectiveness of unions as collec-
tive bargaining agents. 13 7 This finding reasons that the welfare of indi-
vidual employees depends upon the strength of their union. The flaw in
the analysis is its undue deference to the status quo position of the union. It
does not contemplate the positive benefits that individual employees (and
ultimately society) would derive from a more fluid vision of the union as
the exclusive collective bargaining agent.
By viewing the union's status as a potentially transient one -that is, as
limited by its ability to represent all members fairly-the positive attri-
butes of the deterrent effect of a damage suit become more apparent. In
the event that a union is consistently subject to damage suits for its unfair
representation, and the dues paying members are personally affected in an
adverse pecuniary way (i. e., the monthly dues are increased), the necessity
of evaluating whether the union is actually serving the needs of its mem-
bers becomes that much more vital. The ultimate effect would be to com-
pel individual members to take an active interest in a re-evaluation of the
union's performance as their representative.
This proposed analysis relies on a vision of unions which recognizes
their fluid nature as the exclusive representative. It attributes to indi-
vidual union members a dynamic participation in assessing the union's
effectiveness. Such an analysis contemplates employees' rights under sec-
tions 7 and 9 of the NLRA8 8 as ever subject to an evaluation of its repre-
sentative's ability to serve their needs. It assures the employee member that
the union will be responsive to all individuals within the unit -at least to
the extent that it would deter unions from acting arbitrarily, perfunc-
torily, or in bad faith.
137. See IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979), wherein Mr. Justice Marshall
wrote with respect to punitive damages awarded against a union: "Such awards
could deplete union treasuries, thereby impairing the effectiveness of unions as
collective-bargaining agents. Inflicting this risk on employees, whose welfare
depends upon the strength of their union, is simply too great a price for whatever
deterrent effect punitive damages may have." Id. at 50-51 (citation omitted).
138. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 159 (1976). Section 7 of the NLRA provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
shall.also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except to
the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in section 8(a)(3).
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The present judicial predilection to protect union treasuries from the
depletion that damage suits for unfair representation would effectuate
values the stability of the incumbent union too highly. To say that limita-
tion on union liability is indispensable to the collective interests of union
members in protecting limited funds is to ignore the viability of damage
suits in deterring future union derelictions. By holding unions accountable
for the financial liability flowing from unfair representation, union mem-
bers would more likely become vigilant policymakers in the manner envi-
sioned by participatory democracy.
The present state of the law does not engender this vigorous participa-
tion. It evades the issue by passing the cost of the union's unfair representa-
tion on to the employer. The employer then passes that financial burden
on to the public in the form of higher prices for services and products.
Therefore, society at large bears the burden of the union's failure.
To saddle society with the financial burden of a union's failure to fulfill
its duty is to abandon the common law principle of liability based on fault.
The present judicial predilection to protect the depletion of union
treasuries encourages union dereliction and creates a fiduciary duty on the
part of society to act as a guarantor for the resulting liability. Such a result
cannot be fairly judged as socially desirable.
XI. CONCLUSION: CAUSATION ANALYSIS AND THE NEED
TO ARTICULATE UNDERLYING REASONS IN SELECTING
AN ANALYTICAL MODEL
The proper analysis of the apportionment of liability for damages in
section 301 actions against an employer and union involving a union's fail-
ure in its duty of fair representation is one of causation. As Justice Stewart
suggested in his concurring opinion in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,
Inc., 139 causation analysis requires that damages that would not have been
sustained but for union unfair representation are attributable to the union
-not the employer. Recognizing that the utilization of a causation analy-
sis necessarily implies a judicial evaluation of the gravity of each party's
act, the courts must consciously seek to articulate the reasons found to be
determinative in assessing the liability of the respective parties. That this
process may be difficult is not sufficient justification for the failure to
articulate the factors found convincing.
Whether a given court finds the analytical model of the timing of the
act or the quality of the act to be dispositive is not so vital to the develop-
ment of the law as is the effort to express the reasons for selecting a certain
analytical model. When the reasons that underlie the choice of one model
of causation over another are fully identified and articulated, then the
139. 424 U.S. 554, 572-73 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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decision may be evaluated as a proper balancing of competing interests. In
this way, the common law tradition of evaluating competing legislative
grounds will continue to assure the law's viability in fashioning an appro-
priate remedy.
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